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DI/USAF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-32:

EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS IN KOREA ON THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME

I. WHAT EVIDENCE IS THERE THAT THE KOREAN WAR HASA. Created basic disagreements or cleavages among the higher military and political echelons of the Chinese Communist regime?

There is no reliable evidence that the Korean war has created any basic disagreements or cleavages among the higher political and military echelons of the Chinese Communist regime sufficient to affect the over-all political and military control of that regime. There is some evidence of dissatisfaction on the part of some political and military elements, but these are not expected to develop into an active threat to the regime as long as present rigid police controls remain unchallenged.

B. Lessened or increased the degree of popular support for the regime?

Although the Chinese Communist regime initially met with fairly general acceptance among the Chinese people, there were indications of dissatisfaction and disillusionment even before Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The costly and indecisive Korean military operations have intensified these adverse attitudes. The groups most resentful of the regime are believed to be: the peasants, who are suffering from increasingly heavy tax burdens; business and professional people who have become increasingly disillusioned by the economic, educational, and cultural policies of the Communist regime; and Christian and other religious groups which are experiencing increasingly severe Communist suppression. The Communist measures to destroy the traditional Chinese family system have met with strong resentment among all elements of the population.

C. Affected the regime's ability to cope with hostile internal forces?

It is believed, on the basis of evidence received, that the Korean hostilities have not yet prevented the Chinese Communist regime from coping with hostile internal forces. In order to maintain control over these dissident forces, however, the regime has found it necessary to maintain in mainland China a considerable portion of its armed forces which would otherwise be available for combat in Korea. With respect to the Chinese Communist Air Force, the Korean hostilities have had no measurable effect, as CCAF participation in those hostilities has been slight and as the Chinese Communists are not known to have employed, to date, any air elements in maintaining control over hostile internal forces.

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D. Weakened, strengthened, or otherwise affected Sino-Soviet relations?

There is no evidence at this time of significant dissension between the Chinese Communist regime and the Soviet Union. The principal effect of military developments in Korea on Sino-Soviet relations has been to increase progressively the dependence of the Chinese Communist regime upon the Soviet Union for materiel and technical assistance. Soviet failure to provide the required assistance in the face of continuing or increasing Chinese Communist losses in Korea would provide a potential for serious dissension.

II. WHAT EVIDENCE IS THERE THAT THE KOREAN WAR HAS

A. Affected the internal economy of China in terms of such factors as industrial (including munitions) and agricultural output, inflation, rehabilitation and development programs, foreign trade (including trade in strategic materials and pharmaceuticals) and internal transportation?

B. Elicited economic aid from the Soviet Union?

On the basis of fragmentary information, it is believed that the Korean war, to date, has had relatively slight effects on the over-all economic position of the Chinese Communist regime. It is believed, however, that the transportation system has been somewhat strained, inflation has continued, and probably increased, and development programs have probably been retarded. The Soviet Union is not known to have provided the Chinese Communists with economic aid specifically as a result of the Korean hostilities.

III. WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE REGARDING

A. The quantitative and qualitative Chinese losses in military manpower and materiel in the Korean war?

Estimated cumulative losses inflicted on the enemy (Chinese Communist and North Korean) by UN aircraft as of 3 May 1951 include the following approximations: 235 aircraft, 1000 tanks, 1610 field guns, 70,200 buildings, 15,500 trucks and other vehicles, 590 locomotives, 4875 railroad cars, 550 bridges, 440 barges and boats, 975 warehouses, 65 oil storage tanks, 180 machine gun and mortar positions, 3 freighters, 770 pack animals, 2 oil refineries, 1 oil tanker, 29 power plants and 9 trains destroyed; 280 aircraft, 930 tanks, 1265 field guns, 46,700 buildings, 10,325 trucks and other vehicles, 675 locomotives, 8810 railroad cars, 1085 bridges, 875 barges and boats, 535 warehouses, 15 oil storage tanks, 72 machine gun and mortar positions, 2 freighters, 2 oil refineries, 18 power plants, 60 railroad yards, 14 trains damaged. A total of 140,445 enemy troops are estimated to have been killed by air action. It is believed that the Chinese Communist losses in aircraft and pilots have not been such as to reduce the over-all combat capability of the CCAF.

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B. The portion of trained military manpower committed to specific security tasks in China?

There is no evidence to indicate that the Chinese Communists have committed any portion of their available air strength to specific security tasks within China. The Chinese Communists are not known to have used their air strength to any appreciable extent, if at all, in operations against anti-Communist dissident forces in China. Although the Chinese Communists are believed to have strengthened their coastal defenses in mainland China (particularly in the south and southeast), the bulk of the CCAF air strength currently is believed to be located in northeast China and Manchuria. Those air units disposed elsewhere in China are believed to be primarily in training status.

C. The number of uncommitted reserves now available within China?

To date, there is no known distinction between first line and reserve manpower (see Par. IV, B, for comments on flexibility of employment).

The chief limitations on the use of these resources?

The CCAF is largely dependent upon Soviet direction and technical assistance. Therefore, much depends upon the emphasis which the Soviets place on its continued development. Little is known of stockpiling of POL in China, but there are indications that limited logistical capabilities would be a restricting factor in any sustained effort by the CCAF. An additional limiting factor would be the relatively small number of trained personnel. The CCAF is currently estimated to have a total of 1200-1500 active pilots.

D. The nature of military training now taking place in China?

It is believed that the training capability of the CCAF has been steadily increasing and improving. As yet no reliable basis exists for ascertaining the scope and proficiency of the present training program, although about 3000 pilots are reported to be in training in schools in China and Manchuria. Present air activity indicates that some CCAF units are conducting operational unit training and may be approaching a level of training which, by CCAF standards, might be considered a state of combat readiness.

E. Defections from Chinese Communist military forces?

To date there have been no known defections from the Chinese Communist Air Force.

F. The extent of mobilization for either offensive or defensive purposes?

It is believed that the CCAF is mobilized to the full extent of its available facilities and equipment. However, the estimated scope of the present training program would provide the CCAF with personnel necessary for further expansion.

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G. The nature and extent of Soviet military assistance to the Chinese Communists?

With the exception of a few US types acquired by defection or capture from the Chinese Nationalists, all of the combat aircraft and virtually all of the aviation equipment and supplies now available to the CCAF were supplied by the Soviets. There is substantial evidence that the Soviets are now supplying the CCAF with radar, anti-aircraft equipment, and technical personnel, and it is possible that SAF volunteer personnel are operating some of the aircraft currently available to the CCAF.

IV. HOW HAVE THE FOREGOING DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTED CHINESE COMMUNISTS MILITARY CAPABILITIES?

A. Against UN Forces in Korea?

The Chinese Communists have utilized their air strength sparingly so far in the Korean operation and thereby have avoided serious attrition. No specific figures for enemy air personnel losses during the Korean operation are known. As of 3 May 1951, enemy aircraft losses both on the ground and airborne were reported as 235 planes destroyed and 280 damaged. These figures include hostile aircraft encountered over Korea irrespective of their nationality. The Chinese Communists currently are estimated to have available approximately 860 aircraft. Since the Chinese Communist air strength has substantially increased during the Korean operations, despite the above mentioned losses, and since the state of readiness of the Chinese Communist pilots has also undoubtedly improved with additional training, and continued Soviet guidance and assistance, it is not evident that Chinese Communist losses in aircraft and pilots have been such as to force a curtailment of operations which may have been planned for the Korean campaign. On the contrary, the Chinese Communists now possess a far greater capability to conduct aerial warfare than they had at the outset of the Korean operations.

B&C. Against Taiwan and Southeast Asia?

It is estimated that currently the bulk of the aircraft believed to be available to the Chinese Communists are located in NE China and in Manchuria. However, these aircraft could be redeployed to prepared airfields with little delay in the event of operations against Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Since the Chinese Communist air capabilities have increased during the Korean operations and since the aviation losses suffered by them in that campaign have been light to date, it is believed that such losses alone have not caused, in whole or in part, the curtailment, cancellation or deferment of operations possibly planned by the Communists against Taiwan or Southeast Asia. Moreover, in view of the limited nature of Communist air action in Korea to date, such redeployment could be effected without affecting substantially the present type of Communist military operations in Korea, although it would remove much of the present threat of large-scale Communist air action. Materiel support of large or sustained CCAF operations against either Taiwan or Southeast Asia would be difficult as long as Korean operations continue on the present scale. No significant stockpiles of POL and other

aviation supplies and equipment are known to exist south of the Yangtze River. The principal line of communication for materiel support of military operations both in the Korea area and in all parts of China is the Trans-Siberian Railway and the connecting Chinese Changchun Railway in Manchuria. Present evidence indicates that, because of higher priority thus far given to supplies for Soviet Far Eastern military installations and for Communist ground forces in Korea, the quantity of POL and materiel available to the CCAF, even in North China and Manchuria, is little more than sufficient to support current operations. Thus, any large or sustained CCAF operations against either Taiwan or Southeast Asia would probably require a reduction of Soviet materiel support for Korean operations or a reduction of stockpiling at Soviet Far Eastern military installations. It is possible, however, that sufficient stocks of POL and materiel are available at airfields in South China to support air operations of short duration either against Taiwan or against adjoining countries of Southeast Asia.

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